SEELLNG vs. THE CITY OF RACINE.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the District Court of the United States, for the District of
'Wisconsin.
CHARLES SEELING vs. THE CITY OF RACINE.
1. Where the constitution of a State requires, that all general laws shall be published before going into effect ; a legislative act, authorizing a city to issue bonds
for stock in a railroad company, is not a general law within the constitutional
provision; and the bonds are valid, although the act was not published until
after they were issued ; and then in the volume of private and local acts.
2. The city issuing such bonds, in pursuance of the act, cannot controvert the cow
stitutional power of the Legislature, to declare, in the body of the act, that it
shall take effect immediately after its passage.
3. After the act was published, the city authorities paid the interest on the bonds
for several years; and the inhabitants of the city elected commissioners to represent the stock received for the bonds, while they were passing as promissory
notes payable to bearer. These acts are in affirmance of the bonds in favor of a
bona fide holder. He was not bound to look further than the act.
4. An act authorizing a city to issue bonds payable in twenty years, allowed the
city to make the bonds payable twenty years from the date of the act. The bonds
are valid, although they were not made payable twenty years from their date.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-At the trial of this cause, it was shown, that the
legislature of this State passed an act, entitled "An act to authorize the city of Racine to aid in the construction of certain railroads," which was approved February 10, 1853. The act authorized the city council to borrow on the credit of the city three hundred and- fifty thousand dollars, for twenty years, in such sums as
they may deem proper, on interest not exceeding seven er cent,
payable annually in the city of New York, for the purpose of investing three hundred thousand dollars of the same in the capital stock
of a railroad company, authorized to construct a railroad from the
city of Racihe westwardly towards the Mississippi river; and fifty
thousand dollars to the capital stock of a company authorized to
construct a railroad on the shore of Lake Michigan. Or in case
the money should not be borrowed, to subscribe for so many shares
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of the capital stock of those companies in the proportion above
named, and pay for the same in the bonds of the city, payable as
above stated. The shares of the stock in the said railroad companies, and all dividends arising from them, are pledged for the payment of the principal and interest of the city bonds. The city
council shall annually levy a tax upon the taxable property of the
city sufficient to pay the interest of such bonds, after deducting
the dividends due the city on the shares of stock. The legal voters
of the city, at each annual election, shall choose one railroad commissioner, who shall attend the annual meeting of the stockholders
of said corporations for the election of directors thereof, and shall
be entitled to cast one vote for every share of stock which said
city shall hold in said corporations respectively. And this act shall
take effect immediately.
The act was first published in the month of October, 1853, in the
volume of private and local acts, passed by the legislature of Wisconsin, in the year 1853. A resolution of the common council
authorizing the issue of bonds to the Racine and Mississippi Railroad Company, in pursuance of the act, was read. The bonds bear
date March 15, 1853; and it was proven that they were all issued
by the month of May following. The bonds are payable on the
tenth day of February, 1873, to the Racine and Mississippi Railroad Company, or to the holder thereof, at their office in the city of
New York, with interest thereon at the rate of seven per cent per
annum, payable annually on the tenth day of each February thereafter, for stock subscribed by the city in the said company. And
the company agrees that this obligation, and all rights and benefits
arising therefrom may be transferred by general or special endorsement, or by delivery, as if the same were a note of hand payable
to bearer. And the Mayor of the city annexed a certificate to each
bond, that it is issued by the city in pursuance of a special act of
the legislature of the State of Wisconsin, entitled "An Act to
authorize the city of Racine to aid in the construction of certain
railroads, approved February 10th, 1853, and by an unanimous
vote of the city council of said city, passed 'March 15th, 1853.
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Appended to each of said bonds are coupons, signed by the Mayor
of the city, for seventy dollars each, for the payment of the annual
interest. The coupons for the interest payable in the years 1854,
1855, 1856, 1857 and 1858, are detached from the bonds. This
suit is to-recover the contents of the coupons payable in February,
1859, on thirty of the bonds. The bonds are not endorsed. It
was conceded that the stock was issued, and that railroad commissioners were elected to represent the city at the annual elections of
the railroad company.
It was contended at the trial, that the bonds were illegal, and not
binding on the city; as the act of the legislature had not been previously published; and that they are made payable before twenty
years. The court, for the purposes of the trial of the issue, overruled these points ; and directed the jury to find a verdict for two
thousand one hundred dollars, the amount of the face of the coupons ; with request to the counsel for the defendant to move for a
new trial; which was done. The motion having been argued, is now
to be disposed of.
The constitution of this State directs that "The legislature shall
provide by law for the speedy publication of all the statute laws,
and of such judicial decisions made within the State, as may be
deemed expedient. And no general law shall be in force until published." The legislature did provide by law for the publication of
all the statutes or acts ; and in pursuance of the law, the act in
question, with similar a'cts, was published. The act is particularly
stated on the face of the bonds, by the certificate of the Mayor, to
be the authority under which they were issued by the city; and on
the faith of the act in force immediately after its -passage, the
plaintiff purchased them.
Under the authority of the case of the Board of Commissioners
of the county of Knox vs. Aspinwall, 21 Howard, 539, the city is
concluded by its representations on the face of the bonds, in regard
to its authority for issuing them; and cannot go behind them, to
show irregularities in the preliminary proceedings, required by the
act. In the opinion, the .court says: "The act in pursuance of
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which the bonds were issued, is a public statute of a State ; and it
is undoubtedly true, that any person dealing in them is chargeable
with a knowledge of it; and as the board was acting under delegated authority, he must show that the authority has been properly
conferred. The court must therefore look into the statute for the
purpose of determining this question ; and upon looking into it, we
see, that full power is conferred upon the board to subscribe for the
stock and issue the bonds." And it is there decided that, the purchaser of the bonds was not bound to look further for evidence of a
compliance with the conditions to the grant of the power. In the
case of the Royal British Bank vs. Tarquand, cited in the opinion,
the court say :-" We may now take it for granted that the dealings
with these companies are not like dealings with other partnerships ;
and that the parties dealing with them are bound to read the statute
and the deed of settlement. But they are not bound to do more."
I do not think that the Supreme Court intended, by the words
"public statute," to convey the idea that the act under which the
bonds were issued, was a general law affecting the whole people
of the State; but a statute publicly passed by the legislature,
according to the constitution of the State.
It is the duty of courts to enforce statutes, as prescribed by the
law-making power, and to put such construction upon them as will
carry into effect their object. It must be a very clear and unequivocal case, to induce a court to pronounce an act of the legislature
unconstitutional or invalid. It is by no means the duty of a court
of justice so to construe a statute as to retard its operation, or to
affect contracts made in pursuance of it. The universal practice of
the State government has been to consider acts similar to the one
under consideration, of the character of special acts in force from
and after their passage, and, to publish them according to the law,
for that purpose, in the volume of local or private acts. And the
general opinion of jurists and citizens is, that legislative acts similar
to this one, are grants of power to municipal corporations for local
or special objects, and are not general laws affecting the whole
people of the State.. But, in my opinion, the question attempted to
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be raised cannot be considered a legitimate matter of defence. The
obligor in the bonds cannot controvert, by plea or otherwise, the
constitutional power of the legislature to declare in the body of the
act that it shall take effect immediately after its passage.
The act carried on its face all the legislative forms and requirements of a valid and constitutional statute, in force from the day of
its passage. The legislature passed the act as a private or local
act, to take effect immediately, and not from its publication. As
such private act, the people and authorities of the city of Racine
accepted it. As such, the City Council unanimously authorized the
bonds to be issued, in pursuance of its authority. And the Mayor
and City Clerk issued them under the corporate seal. The plaintiff
was not bound to look beyond the act.
Even if the act should be considered by the courts to be a general
law, in the sense of the constitution, affecting the whole people of the
State, and which should have been published before going into
effect, contrary to the legislative declaration and intention, yet the
contract was entered into by the city with this plaintiff, under a law
acknowledged by all parties to be valid at the time this plaintiff
parted with his money. This plaintiff is before the court as a bona
fide holder of the bonds and coupons, for a valuable consideration,
innocently paid on the faith of the validity of the act, and the court
cannot, by a technical construction of the act, release the city from
the payment of a just debt. Under the authority of the act, the
city issued the bonds, and on the faith of it the plaintiff purchased
them, and the court will not allow a supposed technicality to defeat
the recovery of a debt thus honestly contracted. If the question
here attempted to be raised were available, any tax-payer of the city,
by a proper application to the Circuit Court of Racine county,
might have restrained the city from issuing the bonds.
I disclaim any conflict in this opinion with decisions of the
Supreme Court of the State, as contained in manuscript opinions of
judges of that court. That court, in those cases, considered the
matter then decided a legitimate defence, which this court does not.
It is not unusual for the courts of the States and of the United States
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to disagree in their rulings. The rules of practice, and the principles controlling the action and decisions of the different courts, are
in many instances very dissimilar, and in no respect binding on each
other. It is the appropriate duty of the Supreme Court of the
State to construe the constitution and statutes of the State, and it
is the bounden duty of this court to adopt such construction, in
cases involving or requiring it, but not where the construction contended for on behalf of a party is not recognized as a legitimate
matter of defence.
The act was approved February 10, 1853, which authorized the
city of Racine to issue the bonds, payable in twenty years. The
bonds are payable February 10, 1873, and the coupons are payable
on the 10th of February in each year. The bonds bearing date
March 15, 1853, did not allow twenty years, nor one full year for
the first year's interest to run. This is not a suit for the principal
of the bonds, nor for the first year's interest, and consequently, that
objection to these bonds is not tenable.
The city authorities put their own construction upon the act, and
carried it out by issuing bonds as they did, and approved their acts
by paying the annual interest on the bonds for several. years after
the publication of the act, and receiving certificates of stock in the
railroad company as consideration for the bonds.
And the people of the city approved of all this by electing commissioners, under the act, to represent the stock thus received for
the bonds, at the annual elections of the company, while the bonds
were in circulation as promissory notes, payable to bearer. I think
they should not now be permitted to object to the validity of their
own acts. The people of the city of Bridgeport confirmed similar
bonds to these. See The City of Bridgeport vs. The Hou8atonic
Railroad Company, 15 Connecticut Reports, 475.
The motion for a new trial will be overruled, and judgment
entered on the verdict.

THE STATE vs. M'DONNELL.

In the Supreme Court of Vermont, (Clttenden County,) January
Term, 1860.
THE STATE vs. PETER 31'DONNELL.
1. It is a settled rule in Vermont thatthe jury, in criminal cases, may judge of both
law and fact, but it is rather a political or governmental rule than a legal maxim,
and should not prevent the judge from giving his views upon the law of the case
in plain and explicit terms to the jury.
2. A confession of a prisoner should be given in evidence with much caution, and
the judge should carefully instruct the jury as to its weight and value.
3. The correct method of using and applying the language of the text books in a
capital case before the jury and by the judge explained.
4. That the law implies malice from a killing with a deadly weapon, and imposes
upon the accused the burden of showing the contrary, is a principle recognized
and fully established.
5. The true rule in cases of mutual conflict stated and explained.
6. What facts reduce a crime from murder to manslaughter.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
REDFIELD, Ch. J.-I.
The first objection made to the fairness of
the trial in the court below, and which seems to be regarded by the
prisoner's counsel as showing, to some extent, that. the animus of
the whole was unfavorable to their client, is the alleged terms of
disrespect in which the judge made allusion to that rule of law now
recognized in this State, that the jury may judge of the law as well
as the fact, in criminal cases. Any attempt on the, part of a judge,
in the trial of an important criminal case, to prejudice the jury
against an established rule of law applicable to all cases, or to the
particular case, would very justly expose him to severe criticism.
But we do not feel that such is precisely the present case.
The rule of law referred to is strikingly peculiar, as applicable to
jury trials. Where the judge and jury are both required to assume
their distinct and proper functions, the one of the law, and the other
of the fact, it will scarcely be claimed to have any just application to ordinary cases. It surely will not be claimed that the object
and purpose of the rule is, to enable ingenious and eloquent counsel
to procure the acquittal of guilty persons, by inducing juries to put
a misconstruction upon the law, in opposition to the charge of the
court. Nor, that the jury are really more competent judges of the
law than the court arc.
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The most which can fairly be claimed in favor of the rule is, that
it is one of those great exceptional rules, intended for the security of the citizen against any impracticable refinements in the
law, or any supposable or possible tyranny or oppression of the
courts. It has always been regarded as belonging rather to the
department of governmental polity, than to that of jurisprudence,
in the strict sense of that term, and in that view is more justly considered a political, than a legal maxim.
It has indeed been claimed, as one of those great landmarks,
defining, and intended to secure the enforcement of English liberty,
which, although always more or less in conflict and dispute, between
the advocates of prerogative on the one hand, and of the largest
liberty of the subject, on'the other, in that country, from which we
ini fact derive the principle of the rule ; and which, because it is an
exceptional rule, will always be likely to be characterized as an
absurdity by the mere advocates of logical symmetry in the law,
will nevertheless be sure, in the long run, to constantly gain ground,
and become more and more firmly fixed in the hearts and sympathies of those with whom liberty and law are almost synonymous,
and may therefore be regarded rather as an instinct, or a sentiment,
than a mere logical deduction. It is therefore not a thing to be
much reasoned about. It is a power, perhaps, more strictly than
a right, in its primitive existence, but such a power as would be
less likely to be wrongly exercised byjuries, when it was conceded,
than if kept in perpetual conflict, by occasional and sometimes
acrimonious denials on the part of the court.
It is upon this ground that I, for myself, long before the distinct
recognition of the rule by this court, in State vs. Croeau, 23 Vt. R.
14, came to the conclusion that it was best, as a matter of prudence,
not to allow the question to be brought into contest between the
court and juries. Let juries feel that they have the power and
the right to judge of the law in criminal cases, over the heads of
the court, and that they may do this in all criminal cases, if they
choose to take the responsibility, and in practice it will be found
that they will not do it, except in extreme cases. And in such
cases it is perhaps proper enough that they should do it. Judges
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are liable to their full share of infirmity and error, and courts of
the last resort will sometimes fall into errors of so general and serious a character, as to require the modification of the common sense
instincts of the more unsophisticated. This, in civil cases, is well
enough left to the interference of the legislature, but in criminal
cases, affecting life, or character, or liberty, such a resort would
come too late.
But we see no objection, where the interference of a jury is
directly invoked in a criminal case, to the judge stating to the jury,
in his own way, that this rule is not intended for ordinary criminal
cases ; that it is matter of favor to the defendant, and should not
be acted upon by the jury, except after the most thorough conviction of its necessity and propriety; that any departure by the
jury from the law laid down by the court, must be taken solely
upon their own responsibility; and that the safer, and better, and
fairer way, in ordinary criminal cases, is to take the law from the
court, and that they are always justified in doing so.
This is substantially what was done by the court below, and we
see no just ground of exception to the mode in which it was done.
The declarations of the judge were explicit, and characterized by
directness and plainness of speech, and this is, in general, a desirable quality in a charge to the jury. It may be carried too far,
and so become objectionable, like every good thing in excess, but it
does not occur to us that this portion of the charge was specially
objectionable on that. ground. Men will differ in their views, as
to the best manner of dealing with such delicate questions between
the court and jury. Perhaps the surest mode of keeping the jury
within their proper functions, is for the court not to trench upon
their own peculiar province, and not to-evince any suspicion that
they will not reciprocate the courtesy. - I think the more common
fault with juries, is to strive, by disagreements, or in some other
mode, to escape the necessity of taking their own just share of
the responsibility, rather than to usurp the proper province of
the court. This is undoubtedly the more common fault with us
all, in important trials.
II. The mode in which the defendant's confession was put to
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the jury, might be liable to misconstruction, no doubt. The jury
were told that it must "go to the jury as evidence, and they might
give such credence to the different parts of it, under all the circumstances attending the whole case, as they saw fit." It is
claimed that this last expression might, naturally enough, be understood by the jury as giving them an arbitrary discretion, to
use only that portion of it, in making up their verdict, which
made against the defendant. It is certainly not probable the
jury would so have understood the charge. And as we are bound
now, while revising the case upon error, to make all reasonable
intendments in favor of the proceedings below, we shall hardly
feel justified in opening the case upon this ground alone. We
may refer to this subject again.
But, to guard against possible misapprehension, it is proper to
add here, that in cases of such magnitude, where the State resort
to the confessions of the defendant, as evidence against him, it
requires that considerable care be used by the court, lest, either
in the mode of obtaining or the use made of it, injustice might be
inflicted upon the accused. The general public sentiment upon
the subject, that there is no danger of one suffering from his own
confession, although natural and commendable, as evincing a desire
not to have the guilty go unpunished, is certainly not based either
upon sound logic or wise experience.
From tfie general rule, known to all, that the declarations of one
accused of crime are not evidence in his favor, but are evidence
against him, a common jury might not unnaturally come to the
conclusion that the same rule should apply to the different portions of his confession, as it is called, when used in evidence against
him. And it must be admitted, that although the charge upon
this point is sufficiently guarded against such misapprehension,
when viewed in the light of the legal rule upon the subject, yet,
when interpreted by the popular sentiment upon the question, it is
quite susceptible of being so understood as to countenance that acceptation. The case did seem to require that the jury should be
made fully to comprehend that the declarations of the defendant
in his favor were the conditions upon which those against him
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rested, and if used as evidence against him, he might fairly insist
upon the conditions being maintained in his favor, unless disproved
either by the other circumstances, or testimony in the case, or their
own innate improbability or inconsistency and absurdity. The
refusal of the court to respond to the request to give more definite
instructions upon this point, was calculated to impress the mind of
the jury in favor of a strict construction of the declarations of the
defendant, as tending to exculpate him, and a more liberal one
against him. And the failure of the judge, in summing up, to allude
to this confession, as containing any possible circumstance of exculpation, would tend very much to confirm the jury in any impression they might have, that it was not to be weighed in that direction. From all which it is obvious that if the charge was not
positively erroneous on this point, it certainly was not so fully
guarded against misconstruction as was desirable.
III. In regard to Mosier's testimony, the only question made is,
-whether it should have been suffered to go to the jury in the final summing up. This will undoubtedly strike different minds differently.
If there was really any uncertainty in regard to the defendant
having made the assault upon Mosier, as there was confessedly very
considerable doubt whether the person making the assault could
have mistaken Mosier for the deceased, McKeen, the two uncertainties combined would increase the doubt in a compound ratio, and
thus render this testimony too indefinite to go to the jury at all.
One gets a far more vivid, and generally a more correct apprehension of the true force of such circumstances, from hearing the whole
trial and argument upon the facts. I should hesitate, therefore, to
speak with perfect confidence upon a matter of this kind, so as to
open a case for new trial upon this ground alone, until I had taken
time to so study the case in detail as to impress all the facts upon
the memory in such a way as to be able to view each particular
fact and circumstance in all its relations to the other facts and circumstances of the whole case, and thus feel sure I could comprehend its true bearing and force, both positively and relatively. My
present impression is, that, in a case affecting life, testimony of
this loose and unsatisfactory character ought to be wholly excluded
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from the consideration of the jury in the final summing up. It
could not properly have been excluded upon the offer made in connection with this proof. But if, when all the evidence was in, the
theory upon which it had been received was not sustained by any
evidence, but rested in mere possibility or conjecture, about as likely
to be false as true, the consideration of the evidence should not
have been allowed to the jury. But this point is not .intended to
be definitely decided; it strikes the members of the court differently.
IV. But the most serious ground of complaint, in regard to the
trial in this case, seems to us to arise upon the charge affecting the
general nature of the offence..
1. The practice of reading books to the jury, in the manner and
to .the extent it seems to have been done in this case, affords a most
significant commentary upon the general theory of making juries
really attempt to settle the law, upon their own responsibility, in the
ultimate decision of every criminal case, the same as they do the
facts. One might almost as well, for any purpose of actual enlightenment, give the jury a general treatise upon criminal law, and tell them
the whole law applicable to the case would be found under the title
homicide, or manslaughter and murder.
It is unquestionable that a common jury are, from their general
habits of study and reflection, quite incapable of so comprehending
general abstract propositions of law, read consecutively from a book,
as to make any safe and judicious application of them to the facts
of a particular case, and especially a case of this character. But
we are aware that this is often done in these States, where the court
of last resort have trials for murder before them in banc, and formal
opinions upon the law are expected to be given, and this is of necessity done in the presence of the jury ; but the formal opinion of the
court upon the law is intended rather for the profession and the
published reports than for the enlightenment of the jury. That
must be done after the general principles of the law of the case are
settled, by applying them to the particular facts attempted to be
proved in the case.
2. We do not understand that the law read from the books in
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this case was intended to qualify the general propositions laid down
in the charge; but that it was read merely in confirmation of what
is contained in the charge. It is intimated, in the argument for the
prosecution, that if the general propositions laid down in the charge
are erroneous, or require qualification, that this court will look for
that in the books there referred to. This we clearly could not do
without knowing, with certainty, what particular portions of the
books referred to were read to the jury. This we have no means of
determining, as the passages are neither copied into the charge nor
definitely described, so as to be capable of identification. It is obvious, from the blanks left, that it was at one time the intention of
the judge, but it has not been done, and we cannot now do it. The
charge must therefore be taken as it stands upon the bill of exceptions.
3. This seems very correct in the main. But mere abstract
propositions of law, whether read from a book or not, afford
but an imperfect guide to a common jury in the determination
of a complicated case. The most learned, experienced, and
correct judges often misapprehend the proper application of
generalprinciples of law to the facts of a particular case. That is
the principal uncertainty which arises in the trial of causes. It is
not often that the counsel, in a case of this character especially,
differ much as to the principles and rules of law applicable to the
general subject. The general definitions of murder and manslaughter have been well settled for centuries. The only uncertainty arises in regard to the application of these recognized and
familiar principles to the ever-varying facts and circumstances
of particular cases as they arise, no two of which are precisely
alike, or ever will be, and most of which are infinitely varied, in
particulars more or less important, from every adjudged case in the
reports.
4. There is one marked feature in this charge which, in any
view we have been able to take of the case, seems to us incurable.
The entire theory of the defence, with the exception of a single
sentence, which had no natural or just application to the facts of
the case, is studiously and strenuously denied and disregarded.
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The only sentence in the charge, after the judge leaves the general
prefatory propositions and enters upon the particular case, in which
the distinction between murder and manslaughter is brought into
view before the jury, was certainly not framed with any view to the
particular case. It is taken verbatim almost from Wharton on
Homicide, page, 192, and refers to the case of Rex vs. Anderson,
1 Russell on Crimes, 531, and is therefore solely applicable to
another case, and by consequence is the same as a mere abstraction, so far as this case is concerned. It has then no just and proper application to the facts and circumstances of this particular
case. It is in fact, as it seems to us, even more objectionable on
some accounts, as applied to this case, than an entire omission ; for
if the jury attempted to apply it to this case in any literal senseand they are not, in my judgment, required or supposed to be
capable of any other except a literal application of the law given
them to the particular case, and it is therefore the duty of courts,.
in their instructions to juries, to make the law applicable to the
particular case, and not to deal in mere abstractions ; if then the
jury attempted to make any such application of this portion of the
charge to the facts of this case, it certainly must have led them to
the conclusion that there was nothing in the case tending to show
that the offence might have been manslaughter. And this was unquestionably the view taken of the case in the court below, the only
one which makes the charge consistent and reasonable. But we
think this view, although strongly supported by much of the evidence, is not maintainable as the only view to be taken of the case.
5. We will, therefore, examine the case upon its merits, as presented in the facts detailed upon the bill of exceptions.
The principal point of inquiry, as affecting the merits of the
trial, is the evidence tending to show that the offence might have
been only manslaughter. This is the important and proper point
of inquiry in all cases of this character, since it is the duty of the
court, upon common principles of humanity and justice, first, to probounce the criminal innocent until he is proved guilty; and,
secondly, after he is shown to have committed a homicide, to look
for every excuse which may reduce the guilt to the L.west point
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consistent with the facts proved. There is, in the present case, still
further reason for directing inquiry towards this point, inasmuch
as we have seen that the county court evidently did not feel justified
in giving the prisoner the benefit of any such construction of the
evidence as would reduce the offence below the grade of murder.
We need not inquire, in regard to the law of homicide, further
than the facts in this case seem to require. Some question is made
in the argument in regard to the prima facie presumption of malice,
resulting from the mere fact of death, by the hand of the accused.
It does not seem important here to discuss that question, as the
proof shows the manner of the death. There is no doubt that such
a rule as that laid down by the court in this case, that the law implies malice from the killing with a deadly weapon, and thus imposes
upon the accused the burden of showing the contrary, has long been
recognized in the courts both of this country and England. The
rule is thus expressed in 1 Hawkins' P. C. 82, ch. 131, § 32, "That
wherever it appears that a man killed another, it shall be intended,
prima facie, that he did it maliciously, unless he can make out the
contrary, by showing that he did it on sudden provocation," &c.,
citing Kelyng's Reports of Crown Cases, temp. Charles 2, 27.
The same general proposition is substantially repeated in all the
subsequent treatises and reports, where the question has arisen; but
it seems to have been done without much examination, and one
might be allowed to question its application to the mere fact of killing, since being but a presumption of fact, in the absence of all evidence in regard to the mode of death, the presumption of innocence
must be allowed to prevail over that of malice. But the mode of
inflicting death often indicates, with more or less force, the motive
and the probable degree of deliberation. Killing by poison clearly
indicates malice, where the poison is given in such quantities as
ordinarily to produce death. The same may be said when death is
produced by- resort to a deadly weapon, upon a vital part. This
results from the presumption stated in the charge, that one intends
the natural consequences of his acts. We see, therefore, no ground
to complain of the rule, as qualified by the judge in this case. This
is undoubtedly one of those points where the jury should be expected
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to judge for themselves, as it is a subject which they understand as
well as the court, since it has reference to matter of fact, rather than
of law. And where a rule of this character is attempted to be applied to a case to which it was never intended to have any application-as, for instance, to the mere fact of killing, as the rule, as
laid down in Hawkins and in most of the treatises, might be made
to apply-it must be, in my judgment, eminently suitable and proper
that the jury should be allowed to test the force of the rule, as laid
down by the judge, even by the application of their own experience
and common sense instincts, to the rule itself. I should never question the right of a jury to raise, in criminal cases, any question of
law so entirely within the range of their own knowledge and experience. Any one could scarcely be expected to find a verdict upon
a rule of law, where his own conscientious convictions were so capable of a direct application to the rule, and where it did violence to
the common experience of mankind. But it is not often, perhaps,
that a rule of law is susceptible of so clear and narrow a ground of
trial, or that it is so much at variance with common experience as
to infer malice from the mere fact of killing. But in the present
case the wound indicated malice, whereas, if the deceased had died
by the fall itself, without the stab, the natural presumption would
have been the other way.
1. The first clear point in this case, established by almost the
entire testimony, is that it was a case of conflict, or mutual combat,
at the moment of the encounter. We leave out of question here all
evidence of previous malice. At the time nothing had occurred, or
was occurring, which called for forcible interference on the part of
the deceased. The rattling of his door, and the ribald speeches
made in connection therewith, had ceased; The accused was quietly
passing along the sidewalk. He was questioned in regard to what
he had done, or why he did it. He made an evasive and insulting
reply. But this gave no occasion for IlcKeen to interfere forcibly.
But the witnesses all concur that he did advance to meet the
defendant, that he met him about half way. The witnesses
could not say which moved the swiftest; thought defendant
did, but not sure. They were about six feet apart, when both
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advanced, and met about half way. This is certainly not an attack
solely on the part of the prisoner. He may have been, and probably was, the remote cause of the conflict; but it seems probable
enough, from all the testimony as to the mode in which the encounter began, that McKeen might have avoided it if he had so chosen.
2. Being, then, a case of mutual combat or conflict, it does not
appear very clearly which struck first. Both seem to have been
in a state of preparation for the encounter; the witnesses so describe
McKeen. Both, it may be fair to conclude, intended to strike first,
and to disable his adversary, so. as to put him out of the combat
or bring him to terms. The confession of the defendant attributes
the first blow to McKeen. In a case of mutual combat, it does not
seem to be regarded as important to the character of the homicide
which did give the first blow. The prima facie presumption in
regard to all such encounters upon equal terms is, that neither
intends to kill or do grievous bodily harm to the other. But if
there is evidence of a murderous intent at the time of beginning the
affray, the homicide will be murder. It is upon this ground that
the law places stress upon the parties being upon equal terms in the
beginning of the conflict; for if one take a deadly weapon into the
affray with the design of using it in the fight, and especially if this
be unknown to the other party, it will afford strong evidence of
malice. Hence, if a man draw his sword before the other has time
to draw, and thrusts his antagonist through the body, whereby he
dies, it is murder, for it shows a purpose of killing, in the first
instance.
3.But in this part of the case we do, as we said, lay out of the
account all evidence of previous malice; for if that be shown to the
satisfaction of the jury, and that the prisoner sought the encounter
for the purposes of revenge and punishment of the deceased, although
be might not have intended to take his life, it is nevertheless murder when death ensues. And this is said to be the result, although
in the fight the assailant "be driven to the wall, and there kill his
antagonist in self defence," because he is "guilty of murder in
regard to his first intent." 1 Hawkins' P. C.ch. 31, § 26, citing
Hale's P. 0. 47; Kelyng, 58, 129.
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4. But I understand the true rule, as to bona fie cases of mutual
conflict, is well laid down in 1 Hale's P. C. 456, citing Foster, 297.
That although bare words are not such provocation as to lessen the
crime into manslaughter, "yet if A gives indecent language to B,
and B therefore strikes A, but not mortally, and then A strikes B
again, and then B kills A, that this is but manslaughter, for the
second stroke made a new provocation, and so it was but a sudden
falling out; and though B gave the first stroke, and after a blow
received from A, B gives him a mortal stroke, this is but manslaughter, according to the proof: the second blow makes the
affray."
5. If, then, the jury should regard this as a bona fide case of
mutual combat, without previous malice on the part of the accused,
and that mutual blows were given before the accused drew his knife,
and that he then drew it in the heat and fury of the fight, and dealt
a mortal wound, although with the purpose of doing just what he
did do, that is of taking life, or what would be that intent, if he had
been in such a state as properly to comprehend the nature of his
act, it is still but manslaughter.
6. Although, therefore, it must be admitted that so mortal awound,
inflicted with such a weapon upon so vital a part of the person, upon
such slight provocation, must always excite in the mind of the
thoughtful and considerate, strong apprehension that it did result
from a mtirderous purpose; yet it seems to us, that there was a good
deal in the case calculated to impress the minds of a jury with a
more favorable construction towards the defendant, and that it
should, therefore, have been submitted to them with instructions
applicable to the particular facts.
1. It was clearly a case of mutual combat, and continued for such
length of time that mutual blows might have been, and probably
were given.
2. The defendant's declarations, given in evidence by the prosecution, all of which are made evidence, was that McKeen gave the
first blow, having previously used insulting language.
3. The knife, by which the mortal wound was inflicted, is not
shown to have been one which the defendant did not ordinarily
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carry about him. It appears to have been one in constant use about
his business, and, very likely, might have been constantly carried
about his person.
4. There is no direct proof when it was drawn, or with what specific intent. That is matter of inference, in regard to which there
is undoubtedly room for debate.
5. The medical testimony appears to my mind to favor the conclusion that the fatal character of the wound might have been caused
by the fall. If the construction of the principal medical witness is
entirely correct as to the suddenness with which death would ensue,
and especially the absolute incapacity of the wounded person to continue the struggle, or even to speak, after the full penetration of the
knife into the heart, it would seem almost certain that, from the
other testimony, the conflict must have continued a considerable
time-long enough for the exchange of blows-before the knife was
resorted to, and that when first struck, it only penetrated into the
breast bone, not reaching the heart, and probably not reaching the
large nerve named, and that it was thrust through to its fatal result
by the fall. It is not improbable that further examination and
reflection may somewhat qualify this theory in the opinions of the
medical witnesses. It seems to me, however, scarcely possible that
so fatal a wound could have been inflicted to the full extent, until
the very close of the affray. The time of inflicting the wound is
important chiefly in reference to another question, the existence of
a previous purpose of-using the knife in the combat; for if that
point is established against the defendant, to the satisfaction of the
jury, it makes the homicide a clear case of murder.
The strongest point against the defendant, in this view of the
case, arises from the improbability of his being able, in the very
short time which elapsed during the affray, and in so heated a contest, to have drawn, and opened his knife. But if the spring of the
knife were moderate, or considerably worn, this might possibly be
done with more facility than is now altogether obvious to us. At
all events it is a point, which the defendant has the right to have
the jury consider, with every other question of fact, or circumstance, or inference, or probability, in his favor, none of which seem
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to us, so far as the defence is concerned, to have been properly submitted to their consideration at the trial. And unless we could
fairly say, that there was no testimony in the case, tending to reduce the crime to mauslaughter, we could not feel justified in passing sentence of death, until that testimony had been fully submitted
and fairly weighed and determined by the jury, whatever we might
think of the probable result. That is not a question here.
It seems to me, that if the jury should not find the fact, that previous malice existed, on the part of the prisoner towards the deceased, of a character which induced him to seek the quarrel, or that
he went into the affray, with his knife drawn, or with the intention
of using it, or thinking of it as a possible resort in case of convenience, to be used in the affray; but that his drawing and using
it was altogether an afterthought, subsequent to the encounter,
that it must be regarded as a case of manslaughter. In this view
of the case it must be altogether conjectural, whether the defendant
would conceive the idea of killing at all; and if he did, in his blind
fury, it could not fairly be presumed to have been done with any
such deliberation as to constitute murder, unless there is some
distinct evidence of more coolness than ordinarily exists in such
cases. This is the doctrine laid down in the books, and it corresponds with my own experience in the trial of a considerable number of cases of homicide, in cases of mutual contest. There will be
likely always to be such evidence of heat of blood, as to render it
too doubtful, in regard to the existence of deliberate malice, to allow
the jury to convict of murder, unless upon distinct and satisfactory
evidence of previous malice.
in every other view the case wears very much the aspect of murder. For the rule laid down by the court, that if the design to
kill were formed deliberately, for ever so short a time before the
infliction of the mortal wound, or if it were. formed, without such
provocation as the law regards as sufficient justification for anger
and heat of blood, that is, upon mere words, however provoking, and'
before a blow were given by the deceased, the offence is murder, is
most undoubted law. And if one inflict a mortal wound, with a
deadly weapon, like a sharp knife, upon a vital part, as in the pre-
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sent case, it is a presumption of fact, that he did design the natural
consequences of his act; and it is murder, unless be shows that the
result was not designed, or it was done in heat of blood, upon legal
provocation.
So, too, if the prisoner went to this store, with the purpose of
drawing the deceased into a fight, and then after he had succeeded,
resorted to the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part, and death
ensued, it is a fair presumption of fact, that he intended to take life
in the outset, either absolutely, or, if it became necessary in order
to overcome the deceased, anA in either case it is murder.
So, too, on the other hand, if the prisoner went there, without any
thought of a figlt, or entered the fight without any thought of using
his knife, and after receiving a blow or blows, got so heated in his
blood, as to be incapable of acting with deliberation, and having no
deliberately formed feelings of malice or revenge, seized upon the
first weapon he could lay hold of, and that happened to be this knife,
and dealt the mortal blow, although in his mad fury he struck
where he supposed he should most damage his adversary, it is still
but manslaughter; even if the jury should think the defendant
intended to kill, or did that, in his madness, which he must have
supposed would kill, if he were capable of intimating consequences.
In this view the point of time and the manner of inflicting the mortal wound is of great importance to be considered by the jury. And it
will be affected to a considerable extent by a consideration of the
length of time the conflict continued, What was done, whether this
could have been done after the fatal wound was inflicted, or how
much of it could have been done after that. It willof course not
escape the consideration of a jury, in this connection, that the mere
estimate of time, by witnesses under such circumstances, is proverbially imperfect, and very liable to seem many times longer than
it is. This will be corrected by the comparison of different estimates, and more especially by the particular acts which transpired.
The law of manslaughter is very correctly defined by Chief
Justice Shaw, in Webster's case, 5 Cush. Reports, 295. "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another, without malice, and
may be either voluntary, as when the act is committed, withi a real
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design and purpose to kill, but through the violence of sudden passion occasioned by some great provocation, which in tenderness for
the frailty of human nature, the law considers sufficient to palliate
the offence; or involuntary, as when the death of another is caused
by some unlawful act, not accompanied with any intention to take
life.'" 14Every man, when assaulted with violence or great rudeness, is inspired with a sudden impulse of anger, which puts him
upon resistance before time for cool reflection, and if during that
period he attacks his assailant, with a weapon, likely to endanger
life, and death ensues, it is regarded, as done through heat of blood
or violence of anger and not through malice, or that cold blooded
desire of revenge which more properly constitutes the feeling, emotion, or passion of malice.'"
From all we have said it will be obvious that the first point of
inquiry before the jury, will be in regard to the existence of preconceived malice on the part of the defendant, before he went into
the combat. In this view, the nature and character of the wound,
and the manner of its infliction, will have an important bearing.
This being got over, the second leading inquiry will be as to the
existence of any legal provocation, not as a blow or blows inflicted
by the deceased, and the occurrence of hot blood in consequence.
The defendant having established the negative of the former, and
the affirmative of the latter, or rendered them fairly doubtful in the
estimation of the jury, will be entitled to claim a verdict of manslaughter, otherwise he is guilty of murder, from the nature, extent,
and consequence of the wound.
The verdict is set aside and a new trial granted.
In the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
LEMUEL W. WEEKS, APPELLANT,

agatnSt

THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE AND

OTHERS, RESPONDENTS.
1. The system of making city improvements by Cities, by grading and improving
streets, and taxing the owners of lots therefor by the front foot, is constitutional.
2. The judiciary have no power to inquire into or correct any matter of enlargement of city boundaries by annexation of new territory made by the Legislature,
as that is a matter within their discretion; and when such territory is annexed,
it must be taxed the same as other lands within the city limits.
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3. The City cannot create a nuisance upon the plaintiff's lots and then tax him for
abating it.
4. The exemption of the Newhall House (a large hotel) from taxation, by the common council, was without authority of law, and vitiates the entire tax for thle
year of such exemption.

-E. . Byan, of counsel for plaintiff.
E. .F. Prentiss,attorney for plaintiff.
[elson. Cross, of counsel for the City.
Geo. A. Woodward and Hf. L. .Palmer,City attorneys.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAINE, J.-This action was brought by the appellant to restrain
the sale of a large quantity of real estate, for taxes, upon several
alleged grounds of illegality. A large share of the real estate
consisted of city lots, and a corresponding share of the taxes was
for assessments against these lots, for building streets, sidewalks,
&c., under the charter of the city.
The most important objection urged against their legality, is that
the provisions of the charter itself, authorizing these assessments,
are a violation of the constitutional provision that the rule of taxation shall be uniform. I have no doubt if these assessments.are
to be sustained at all, that it must be done upon the ground that
they are an exercise of the taxing power. It is true there are
many cases in which it has been said that they are not taxes. Bat
when Justice Barculo, in the People vs. Brooklyn, 6 Bar. 209, carried out this doctrine to its logical result, and held that not being
taxes, they were the taking of private property for public use without compensation, the Court of Appeals, in order to avoid his conclusion, were compelled to uphold them as an exercise of taxing
power. 4th Com. 419. I have also no doubt that the constitutional
provision, that the rule of taxation shall be uniform, extends to

taxation by cities, towns and counties, exercising as they do a portion of the sovereign power, delegated to them by the State. It is
true, as I had occasion to contend in the case of Clark vs. The City
of Janesville, that most of the provisions of article 8, where this is
found, apply to the action of the State, as such, and not to the
40
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action of its minor political divisions. A city or county is not a
State, and if it contracts a debt, that is not a State debt. But
when either exercises the taxing power, it is acting for the State, as
taxation is an attribute of sovereignty. When, therefore, the
Constitution requires the rule of taxation to be uniform, I think it
extends to all taxation by the State, whether acting directly, or by
delegating its authority to political corporations. The object of
this provision was to protect the citizen against unequal, and consequently unjust taxation. And this object would clearly be defeated
if the State, by delegating the power, placed its agents beyond the
restriction of the rule. And this view, I think, is not impaired by
the provision of Art. XI. Sec. 3, requiring the Legislature, in establishing municipal corporations, to restrict their powers of taxation
so as to prevent abuses, &c. Restrictions may be, and undoubtedly
are, necessary to prevent abuses which might not amount to violations of the rule of uniformity. There may be a uniform abuse of
the taxing power, by reckless and improvident management on the
part of these local authorities, and I think the provision last mentioned was designed to furnish a further protection, in addition to
that furnished by the rule of uniformity.
Believing, therefore, that these assessments are an exercise of
the taxing power of the State, and that the rule of uniformity extends to taxation by corporations, I should find it impossible to
uphold them, if the provision requiring the rule to be uniform was
the only provision in the constitution bearing upon the question.
I think, with Chief Justice Bartley, in Bank vs. Hines, 3 Ohio St.
Rep. 15, that "uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden
of taxation." This equality in burden constitutes the very substance designed to be secured by the rule. But the principle upon
which these assessments rests, is clearly destructive of this equality.
It requires every lot owner to build whatever improvements the
public may require on the street in front of his lot, without reference to inequalities in the value of lots, in the expense of constructing the improvements, or to the question whether the lot is injured
or benefited by their construction. Corner lots are required to
construct and keep in repair three times as much as other lots, an,1
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yet it is well known that the difference in value bears no proportion
to this difference in burden. In front of one lot the expense of
building the street may exceed the value of the lot, and its construction may impose on the owner additional expense to render his
lot accessible. In front of another lot of even'much greater value,
the expense is comparatively slight. These inequalities are obvious,
and I have always thought that the principle of such assessments
was radically wrong. They have been very extensively discussed,
and sustained upon the ground that the lot should pay because it
receives the benefit. But if this be true, that the improvements in
front of a lot are made for the benefit of the lot only, then the right of
the public to tax the owner at all for that purpose fails. Because the
lublid has no right to tax the citizen to make him build improvements
for his own benefit merely. It must be for a public purpose, and it
being once established that the construction of streets is a public purpose, thatwill justifytaxation. Ithink it follows, if the matter is tobe
settled upon principle, that the taxation should be equal and uniform,
and that to make it so, the whole taxable property of the political division in which the improvement is made, should be taxed by a uniform
rule, for the purpose of its construction. But in sustaining these
assessments, when private property was wanted for a street it has
been said the State could take it, because the use of a street was a
public use; in order to justify a resort to the power of taxation, it
is said the building of a street is a public purpose. But then having
got the land to build- it on, and the power to tax by holding it a
public purpose, they immediately abandon that idea, and say it is a
private benefit, and make the owner of the lot build the whole of it.
I think this is the same in principle as it would be to say that the
town in which the county seat is located should build the county
buildings, or that the county where the capital is, should construct
the public edifices of the State, upon the ground that by being located
nearer, they derive a greater benefit than others.
If the question, therefore, was whether the system of assessment
could be sustained upon principle, I should have no hesitation in
deciding in the negative. I fully agree with the decision of the
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Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of Municipality No. Two
vs. Wite et al., 9 Louis. Rep. 447, upon this point.
But the question is not, whether this system is established upon
sound principles, but whether the Legislature has the power, under
the Constitution, to establish such a system. As already stated, if
the provision requiring the rule of taxation to be uniform was the
only one bearing upon the question, I should answer this, also, in
the negative. But there is another provision, which seems to me so
important that it has changed the result to which I should otherwise
have arrived. That provision is Sec. 3 of Art. XI., and is as
follows :-" It shall be the duty of the Legislature, and they are
hereby empowered to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit,
so as to prevent abuses in assessments and taxation, and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations."
It cannot well be denied, if the word assessment, as used in this
section, had reference to this established system of special taxation
for municipal improvements, that then it is a clear recognition of
the existence and legality of the power. Had it such meaning ?
I think it had, for the following reasons :-This system of special
taxation, upon the basis of supposed special benefits, had existed for
years and given rise to much discussion and litigation in the older
States. Although in itself being strictly an exercise of the taxing
power, yet it has been frequently assumed otherwise, and has been
so far separated and distinguished from a general taxation as to
have obtained a distinct name, and that name assessment. As such,
it has been known and described for a number of years in the older
States, in their contracts, laws and constitutions. A clear distinction between it and other taxation -was established.
,It seems to me therefore that when the Constitution expressly
recognizes the "power of assessment" in municipal corporations, it
had reference to this system which had been so long known and
described under that name. I know of nothing else to which it
could have reference. It was suggested on the argument, that it
meant the assessments of taxes generally. But I cannot see how
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this idea can be sustained when the word "taxation," which includes
all the steps necessary to taxation, immediately precedes the word
"assessment." It is said, "the Legislature may 'restrict' their
power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money," &e. Now to say
that the word "assessment" as here used had reference to the assessment of taxes generally, is to make the instrument guilty of a
useless as well as awkward repetition. Having first covered the
whole ground by the word "taxation" it would then go back over
a part of it again, by the word "assessment," which is only a step
in taxation. Such a use of language would be exceedingly constrained and unusual in any instrument, and particularly so in a
Constitution, which usually deals in general terms without going
into details. If any tautology at all was to be looked for there, it
should be in the use of some word of equivalent meaning to -the one
already used, and not of one expressing only a small part of it. I
think also that the word assessment, having reference to the general
assessment of taxes, has never in common practice been used alone,
as expressing that idea; on the contrary, when that is the idea to be
conveyed, it is said the "assessment of taxes," as men say the
"levying of taxes," or the "collection of taxes." But it has an
established meaning when used alone, and that is this specific taxation. The word "assessment" then includes all the steps necessary to this word taxation, just as the word "taxation" includes all
necessary steps to taxation generally. And when I find the Constitution recognizing in municipal corporations the power of "taxation"
and "assessment," I cannot resist the conclusion that this latter
word had reference to that particular species of taxation known as
a whole by that name. And if it did, it is a clear recognition of
the power, and the question here being only as to the power, is
conclusively determined by it.
The same effect was given to the same clause in the Constitution
of Ohio, by- the Supreme Court of that State, in a recent decision
in the case of Hill vs. Higdon, 5 Ohio State Reports 243, and
the reasoning of Chief Justice Raney up-on the question, I think it
impossible to answer. This provision then, recognizing the power
of assessment in municipal corporations, is so far a modification of
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the rule of uniformity, as the system of assessment is a departure
from that rule. And the principle of it being, as before stated, to
compel every lot to build the streets in front of it, with such exceptions as are usually provided in case of extraordinary expense, and
which exist in the charter of Milwaukee, it cannot be said that
under the Constitution constructing the two sections together, and
giving due effect to both as we are bound to, the Legislature has
not the power to authorize these assessments. For whatever abuses
may be practiced under it, and they are doubtless great, the only
remedy is in such restrictions as the wisdom of the Legislature may
impose on the exercise of the power, and for every citizen of these
corporations to faithfully discharge his duty as such, and give
necessary attention to the bdministration of public affairs, and not
leave them to the exclusive management of plundering mercenaries,
and then groan under the oppression of that result.
Another alleged ground of illegality is, that certain farming
lands of the plaintiff, which had never been laid off into lots, and
were not needed for city purposes, had been annexed to the city by
an act of the Legislature, and afterwards taxed at the same rate as
other city property. I think this question resolves itself entirely
into a question whether the Legislature has power to annex adjoining territory to a municipal corporation. Because, if such power
exists, and this land was annexed, it seems very clear that it must
afterward9 be taxed by the same rule as other property in the
political division where it then belongs. The rule of uniformity
would require this. And we have held at the present term, in the
case of .Knowlton vs. Supervisors of Rock County, that no discrimination could be made in such case, between lands in the same
taxing district, so that a part should be taxed at one rate upon their
value and the rest at another. And this seems so clear that while
counsel apparently conceded that the Legislature might annex the
lands for some purposes, he yet claimed that they could not do it
for taxing purposes; but for these, it was still a part of the town in
which it was previously located. But I think this position cannot
be sustained. Such a rule would be impracticable, and to sustain
such a double ambiguous character for any district, must lead to
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great confusion and uncertainty. If the power exists to annex,
when it is exercised, the district must be annexed for all purposes.
Whether it is a wise or just exercise of the power, courts cannot
inquire; those are questions for the Legislature. Parties owning
lands upon the borders of cities must hold them subject to their
disadvantages as well as -advantages. If, when they are first annexed, they are subject to undue burdens, this is perhaps in some
measure compensated by the fact that before being annexed they
had long enjoyed great advantage from their vicinity to a prosperous
city, without contributing anything towards the burdens of building
it. But an objection is made to the legality of the general tax of
that year, which I am compelled to sustain. It appears from the
case that several lots in the city, upon which the Newhall House was
in process of erection, of the value of from $150,000 to $200,000,
were purposely omitted to be taxed, and no State, county, city or
school tax levied or assessed upon them. It appears from the complaint and stipulation of the parties, that this omission was intentional on the part of the city authorities, and it was conceded on
both sides that an ordinance was passed by the common council
expressly exempting that property from taxation for the years
1856 and 1857, "in view of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to the city."
I have no doubt this exemption originated in motives of generosity
and public spirit. And perhaps the same motives should induce the
tax-payers of the city -to submit to the slight increase of tax thereby
imposed on each, without questioning its strict legality. But they
cannot be compelled to. No man is obliged to be more generous
than the law requires, but each may stand strictly upon his legal
rights.
That this exemption was illegal, was scarcely contested. I shall
therefore make no effort to show that the common council had no
authority to suspend or repeal the general law of the State, declaring what property shall be taxable and what exempt. But the
important question presented, is whether, conceding it to have been
entirely unauthorized, it vitiates the tax assessed upon other property ? And upon this question, I think the following rule. is
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established, both by reason and authority. Omissions of this character arising from mistakes of fact, erroneous computations or errors
of judgment on the part of those to whom the execution of the taxing
laws is entrusted, do not necessarily vitiate the whole tax. But
intentional disregard of those laws in such manner as to impose illegal taxes on those who are assessed, does. The first part of the
rule is necessary to enable taxes to be collected at all. The execution of these laws is necessarily entrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes of fact, and errors of judgment. If
such errors on the part of those who are attempting in good faith to
perform their duties should vitiate the whole tax, no tax could ever
be collected. And therefore, though they sometimes increase improperly the burdens of those jaying taxes, that part of the rule which
holds the tax not thereby avoided, is absolutely essential to the continuation of government. But it seems to me clear that the other
part is equally essential to the just protection of the citizen. If
those executing these laws may deliberately disregard them, and
assess the whole tax upon a part only of those who are liable to pay
it, and have it still a legal tax, then the laws afford no protection,
and the citizen is at the mercy of those officers who by being
appointed to execute the laws, would seem to be placed thereby
beyond legal control. I know of no considerations of public policy
or necessity that can justify carrying this rule to that extent. And
the fact that in this instance the disregard of the law proceeded
from good motives, ought not to affect the decision of the question.
It is a rule of law that is to be established. And if established here,
because the motives were good, it would serve as a precedent when
the motives were bad, and the power usurped for purposes of oppression. In Henry vs. Chester, 15 Verm. 560, the court says:
"It is indispensable to the legality of any tax imposed by the
town, that it should have been made upon a list of the polls, and
ratable estate of the inhabitants, in substantial and bona fide compliance with the requisitions of the statute."
And again, upon two grounds, then, we think this was a void list.
1st. The plain and obvious requisitions of the statute in regard to
making up the list were disregarded both by important and essen-
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tial omissions, and by arbitraryadditions without even the color of
right or legal warrant. If this may be done, and still the list be
regarded as legal, so might it with equal propriety, if the entire
real estate in town were omitted, or inserted wholly at random without even the form of an appraisal."
The court also quotes the following rule as stated by Chief Justice
Shaw, in Torrey vs. Millbury, 21 Pick. 65: "One rule is very
plain and well settled, that all those measures which are intended
for the security of the citizen, for securing an equality of taxation,
&c., are conditionsprecedent, and if they are not observed, he is not
legally taxed, and he may resist it." True, the court then adds, as
a qualification of the general proposition, that these measures, in
order to become "conditions precedent," must be such matters as
enter into the frame work of the assessment, and affect its principle, and not its detail merely. But it is evident, from the remark
before quoted, that they considered important and essential omissions, "without the color of right or legal warrant," as having such
effects. And it seems very evident that they would have; because
one of the'essential elements of the validity of a tax is that it should
be assessed upon a list embracing the taxable property of the district, made out with as much accuracy as results from a bona fidb
attempt on the part of those who make it to fulfill their duty according to law. And when such a list is not had, but instead of it, one
in which those whose duty it was to make it have intentionally
included only a part bf the taxable property, and left out an important part, the essential basis of a legal tax fails, and the necessary
result is a destruction of that "equality of taxation," all the "measures" to secure which, in the language of Chief Justice Shaw, are
"conditions precedent" to the legality of-the tax.
In the subsequent case of Spear vs. The Town of Braintree, 24
Verm. 414, the same rule was re-asserted; though in that case they
held the error complained of to be a mere error in judgment, in a
bona fide attempt to fulfill the duties of the office according to law;
and they distinguished it from the case of Henry vs. Chester, by
saying: "That case was decided as it was, chiefly upon the ground
that the defects in the list could not be fairly regarded as acciden-
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tal or bona fide." In The State vs. Brannin, 3 Zab. N. J. Rep.
484, it was held, that where an assessment was made in the city of
Trenton, for city and county purposes, a separate poll tax being
required by law for the city tax, and only one poll tax was assessed,
the whole assessment was void.
In the subsequent case of Te State vs. The Collector of Jersey
City, 4 Zab. 108, the assessor had omitted to assess the churches,
and the court held that it did not avoid the whole tax. But they
placed it upon the ground that it was a practice that had universally
prevailed in the State, and in accordance with a contemporaneous
construction of the law, "which they would probably have sanctioned had the question been formally raised." It is true, they add,
that for an omission to assess property really taxable, the assessment ought not to be held void, but that is a matter to be left to the
vigilance of the assessor. But they qualify this by adding, "unless
it be in cases involving a palpable and greatly injurious disregard
or misconstruction of plain requirements of the law."
But the counsel for the city rely strongly on the case of Page vs.
The City of St. Louis, 20 Mlo. 136. In that case an act of the
legislature had established a system of sewerage in St. Louis, and
provided that the real estate in each district should be taxed annually to pay the debt, for which the city was authorized to issue its
bonds. The city passed an ordinance for the creation of a sewerage
fund, and'providing that any of the tax payers who would pay into
this fund such proportion of the whole debt as the assessed valuation
of his taxable property bore to the whole assessed valuation of his
district, should be thereafter exempt.
A certain party had availed himself of this privilege, and afterwards placed further improvements on his property, rendering it
more valuable, and it was no longer taxed for the sewerage debt.
The plaintiff, who was taxed, complained that this exemption vitiated his tax. But the court decided against him, expressly on the
ground that it did not appear that his tax was at all increased by
the exemption, nor that the party who had advanced his proportion
of the whole debt had not paid all that he ought to pay. But this
case is entirely different; for here it is conceded that the plaintiff's
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tax, as well as that of all the other tax payers, was increased by the
omission of the Newhall House property. It is true, the court indulges
in some general remarks on the inconvenience of arresting the proceedings of a city, and closes by saying, "The right of a corporation de facto will be enforced. It is no defence to the claim of a
corporation that it has violated its charter.;' If by this it was only
meant that when a corporation is enforcing a legal claim, it is no
defence to say it has violated its charter in some other matter, that
may be conceded. But if it was meant to say that, when a corporation is enforcing an illegal claim, which is itself a violation of its
charter and the law, and works injustice upon the defendant, it is
no defence to show such violation, I, for one, must be permitted to
dissent. I do not understand- that even to avoid a suspension of
corporate proceedings, it is proper to break down all barriers against
illegal taxation, and say that a city may enforce the collection of
an illegal tax just as well as though it were legal.
In Wiggins vs. New York, also cited, the decision is only that
the Court of Chancery would not interfere on account of errors of
judgment in the commissioners assessing benefits and damages on
opening streets, the proceedings having been regular. And in
examining some of the alleged irregularities, the court sustained the
proceedings, on the ground that they did not "increase the assessments" upon others, implying, if they had they must be illegal.
The case of Tie Ins. Co. vs. Yard, IT Penn. St. Rep. 321,
was evidently a case of omission of a part of the taxable property
from mistake or ignorance of the fact on the part of the assessors.
The language of the court contemplates only such omission, and contains nothing which shows they would have held the same in regard
to an intentional omission on the part of all the authorities levying
and collecting the tax, of a large portion 6f taxable property, and
assessing its proportion upon the other tax payers.
In Williams vs. School District, 9 Pick. 75, the assessors had
omitted to tax one of the inhabitants of the district, because he was
very poor, and they expected be would soon come upon the town.
The court says: "If this was done through error of judgment, or
any error and mistake of the law in this respect, it does not invalidate the whole tax, and the case shows nothing more."
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I understand the "error of judgment" here referred to, to mean
only such errors on the part of officers as to what the law required
of them, and not an error of judgment by which, knowing what the
law was, they supposed they had a right to repeal or suspend it.
It cannot be said here that the omission occurred from an error of
judgment, by which it was supposed that the Newhall House property was not taxable by law. The very fact of passing an ordinance to exempt it, implies knowledge that it was taxable. The
only error of judgment here was in supposing they had a right to
suspend the law, and relieve a part of the taxable property, and
impose an additional burden on the rest.
Nor do I think that provision of the law that where there has
been an omission to tax pioperty, it may be taxed the proper amount
thie next year, should change the result. That evidently refers to
such omissions as are constantly liable to happen, but which do not
invalidate the tax assessed. But where the omission originates in an
intentional departure from the law on the part of all the authoxities,
and is of such a character as renders the tax illegal, I do not think
this provision can cure it; for it cannot be assumed that those who
paid the illegal tax would continue tax payers long enough to get
back substantially what they had paid under the operation of this
provision. The only question, in my judgment, is, whether the
tax is legal or not.
I am also of the opinion, that the tax assessed against the plaintiff's lots, to abate a nuisance, which it appears was created entirely
by the acts of the city in so constructing a street as to cause the
water to flow and remain upon the spots, which it would not otherwise have done, is illegal. I cannot recognize the right of a corporation to create a nuisance on the lot of an individual; but to create
the nuisance, and then tax him to abate it, is a double wrong. I
shall not attempt any examination of the question upon authority,
but I am satisfied such a right cannot be sustained. I think this
conclusion results from the reasoning of Mr. Justice Smith, in Goodall
vs. Milwaukee, 5 Wis. 32, which I fully approve; and until I am
prepared to say that private rights must yield even to the extent of
total destruction rather than place any impediment in the way of

